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Cultural Patterns of Enlargement: Do Small Central 
European States Share Common Values?71
Karin Liebhart 
Abstract: The ongoing process of Europeanization raises the question of citizen 
support. Political actors in the relevant states seek to promote the acceptance of civil 
society for this development. The political bid for consensus building around EU 
integration and the enlargement process is accompanied by public campaigns. Against 
this background this paper deals with selected images that figure prominently in these 
campaigns, using three small EU members of the Central European region – Austria, 
Hungary and Slovakia – as examples. Starting from the assumption that national 
and European images used in the respective campaigns refer to underlying cultural 
patterns as frames of political orientation one may analyse commonalities and diffe-
rences in the perception of political roles of the respective states in the new Europe.
Keywords: EU integration and enlargement, political advertisement, public 
campaigns, images, cultural patterns, CEE, Austria, Hungary, Slovakia
Preface
The following remarks are based on preliminary results of a comparative and 
multidisciplinary research project which is currently being conducted within the 
framework of the research programme New Orientations for Democracy in Europe, 
funded by the Austrian Federal Ministry of Education, Science and Culture. The 
Public Construction of Europe (PCE)72 project combines qualitative social science 
approaches with methods of semiotic analysis and focuses on the symbolic level of 
politics, in particular on the field of political advertising and campaigning.
The Public Construction of Europe starts from the following assumptions:
– The ongoing process of Europeanization raises the question of citizen support, 
which cannot be taken for granted;
– Political actors in the relevant states seek to promote the acceptance of civil 
society for this development;
71 The paper was presented at the CEPSA Annual Conference 2005 a New International Role for Small(er) 
States? (Vienna, 19–21 May 2005), Panel 2 Regionalization Processes and Comparative Regional 
Perspectives: ECE, Baltic Area, South Eastern Europe, Central Asia (Caucasus).
72 http://gerda.univie.ac.at/advertisingeurope (Project Management: Andreas Pribersky, Department of 
Political Science, University of Vienna): the consortium consists of the Department of Political Science 
of the University of Vienna, the Institute for Socio-Semiotic Studies, the Institute of Political Science of 
the University of Lyon, the Department of Political Science of the University of Economic Sciences and 
Public Administration in Budapest and the Department of Political Science of the Faculty of Arts of the 
Comenius University in Bratislava.
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– The political bid for consensus building around EU integration and the enlarge-
ment process is accompanied by political advertisement and public campaigns;
– These political campaigns have become a decisive policy-making instrument 
due to the importance of the mass media, which has transformed the entire 
texture of politics, in political communication.
Nowadays, the political sphere is mainly perceived as an infinite sequence of 
images. Andreas Dörner (1999 & 2000) calls this phenomenon the “visual turn” in 
political mediation.
Against this background, the purpose of the PCE project is to analyse those 
representations of Europe and the EU that appear in political advertisements and 
are generated in political campaigns on European integration and enlargement.
Below, selected images that figure prominently in these campaigns will be 
presented and analysed from a comparative point of view, using Austria, Hungary and 
Slovakia – three small EU members of the Central European region – as examples. 
Assuming that national and European images used in political campaigns refer to 
underlying cultural patterns (including identity and mentality aspects) as frames of 
political orientation, one may analyse commonalities and differences in the respective 
self-perceptions and the role models the particular states follow in the new Europe.
The three small European states, Austria, Hungary and Slovakia, have been chosen 
due to: 
– common historic experiences they share and that proved their resilience 
despite the European divide after 1945, and the separation over decades as 
a consequence of the Iron Curtain, on the one hand
– similar political culture patterns as characterized, inter alia, by Peter A. Ulram 
(2003), that mark significant differences between the Central European and 
other European regions, on the other hand.
Starting from these presumptions, one may ask how the selected countries evaluate 
their European role and how far the challenges they actually face within the European 
integration and enlargement process are represented in public views and political 
images used in EU campaigning. Also, to what extent the small size of the three states 
plays a decisive role should be questioned: is it seen as a chance, as an asset or does 
– from their point of view– smallness entail specific threats caused by the EU inte-
gration process? Furthermore, the issue is to be raised whether smallness is generally 
addressed in the respective campaigns, and whether it is chosen as a central theme.
The choice of themes and images was analysed by identifying themes which are 
frequently and prominently used in Austrian as well as Hungarian and Slovak EU 
campaigns – albeit with a different emphasis.
Below I will focus on three selected groups of themes occurring in EU campaigns:
– EU accession as a historic turning point and a benchmark for the definition of 
the country’s European role;
– EU membership as a promise of advantages and better chances;
– EU as a global player that provides new role models for small states.
56 57
EU accession as a watershed in national history and ultimate proof 
of the country’s importance for Europe 
In 2005 Austria celebrates not only the 60th anniversary of the founding of the 
Second Republic and the 50th anniversary of the Austrian State Treaty as well as the 
declaration of permanent neutrality, but also the 10th anniversary of the country’s 
entry into the European Union. The latter has been labelled by politicians as the real 
end of the post-war period, the final step in the process of rebuilding Austria after the 
Second World War. Furthermore, in the wake of 1989, as a consequence of the collapse 
of the Iron Curtain, Austria faced an identity crisis of sorts due to the loss of its role 
as the “island of the blessed” in between the two blocs. The role of a neutral meeting 
point and trustworthy go-between in the centre of Europe had been crucial for the 
national self-image for more than four decades and fitted the role of a small state in 
international relations perfectly.
EU membership offered the chance to redefine Austria’s place in international 
politics. Political advertisement reacted to the challenge in using the slogan “We 
are Europe” (“Wir sind Europa”) as a core message in the accession campaign. It is 
remarkable that this slogan was employed again to promote Austria’s first presidency of 
the European Council in 1998. As a matter of fact, the slogan maintains the European 
identity of the country, corresponding to rather than conflicting with national identity. 
In the Austrian collective memory its European identity has been maintained as part 
of national identity.
At the same time, the slogan alludes to the traditional Austrian self-image of 
a bridge between East and West, well known from the tourist image of Austria as the 
“heart of Europe”. In the run-up to accession referendum variations of the slogan “We 
live in Europe – We love Austria (“Wir leben in Europa – wir lieben Österreich”), “We 
are Europeans – We remain Austrians” (“Wir sind Europäer – Österreicher bleiben 
wir”) were used by the Austrian People’s Party.
Logo and slogan of the Austrian EU accession campaign 1992–1994 (Demner, 
Merlicek & Bergmann)
The connecting role of the country as a meeting point is as important for Hunga-
rian self image as it is for the Austrian self-image and is also closely connected with 
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the metaphor of the bridge, frequently presented in tourism brochures. The image of 
Hungary as the most western country in Central and Eastern Europe – “Hungary as the 
Western Part of the East” was the traditional joke about the country during the Kádár 
period – is quite relevant to the supposed cultural and historical tradition of Hungary. 
Hungarian culture was always seen as integrating, an identity aspect that is said to help 
the country to fulfil its European role.
Poster used in the Hungarian EU accession campaign 2003
The bridge symbol served as the central theme of the accession campaign and also 
for the most spectacular ceremonial events in the national accession celebrations. The 
three most famous bridges of Budapest were decorated in different guises: the Lánchíd 
(Chain) Bridge, for example, offered a birthday breakfast for children born on 1 May. 
Celebration events used the bridge metaphor profusely, and bridge-related events took 
place all over the country: The topical association was: “We cross to Europe over the 
bridge” (Kápitany – Kápitanyi, 2004).
With reference to a famous poem of the Hungarian poet Endre Ady, Hungary is 
traditionally seen as a ferry country, oscillating between East and West. This theme 
also addresses the mediator function and was taken up in the run-up to EU accession 
by the Hungarian weekly HVG. The journal raised the rhetorical question “The ferry 
berths?” on the cover page. The picture showed a rope tied around a peg on a ship 
landing stage, which was decorated with the golden stars of the EU. The HVG cover 
conveys the impression that the small country is finally anchored to the West because 
of EU accession.
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Cover of the Hungarian weekly HVG, 1 May 2004
Hungary’s entry into the EU in 2004 was evaluated in political and public 
discourse as a watershed in national history. The respective debates also expressed 
the feeling that Hungary had only temporarily been separated from the Western part 
of the continent by the Soviet occupation. As a result, so-called EU junk-parties were 
popular in Budapest on the eve of EU accession. Collection spots were designated in 
the capital for objects people did not want to take along to the beautiful new world 
of the European Union. The objects dropped off were primarily symbols of socialist 
ideology. Against this backdrop, the EU means the West, the small state has to join, as 
it is expressed in a statement of the MSZP politician József Tóbiás: “Hungary faces 
two routes – a highway which leads to Europe and a swampy field path which leads to 
the Balkans; there is no third route“ (Népszabadság, 29 January 2003).
Compared to Austria and Hungary, the public debate about EU integration had been 
delayed in Slovakia. This was mainly due to domestic political developments – at least 
until the autumn of 1998, the question was not whether Slovakia wanted to join the EU 
but if the EU wanted Slovakia to join. In the case of Slovakia, EU membership was 
connected with the attitude of getting rid not only of the communist past but as well of 
those anti-democratic traditions and political culture patterns that were associated with 
the government of former Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar. From this point of view 
the process of Europeanization meant that Slovaks were exposed to institutions and 
cultures which were simply far more efficient than their own. Thus, the, Slovaks tried to 
identify themselves with the peoples of Western Europe. The positive perception of the 
EU is a reciprocal image of how people perceived Slovakia, which they most frequently 
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described as poor, timid, lacking democratic quality as well as having a clear potential 
for the future and – as a small state – relying on somebody else’s help. The image of the 
Union was therefore very attractive and seemed to compensate for those deficits that 
Slovak citizens perceived negatively in respect to their own country. The campaign in 
general reflected the non-controversial nature of the EU issue in Slovakia. 
While Slovakia, from the perspective of its citizens, lacked European maturity in 
the field of politics to some extent, it was clearly pointed out in the media and public 
discourse that geographically speaking, the country had always been a part of Europe. 
Nevertheless, fears of a loss of national sovereignty of the small state were voiced in 
the run-up to the accession. The accession campaign reacted, inter alia, by presenting 
Slovakia as the missing star in the symbolic configuration of the EU.
Poster used in the Slovak EU accession campaign 2003. Slogan: “We have the future 
in our hands” (Creo/Young&Rubicam)
Poster used in the Slovak EU accession campaign 2003. Slogan: “Let’s not leave it to 
the others” (Creo/Young&Rubicam)
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EU membership as a prospect for advantages and better chances for 
the country
Austrian EU membership was promoted by the government also as a promise for the 
increase of prosperity and economic growth. The slogan “Prosperity or Stagnation?” 
(“Wohlstand oder Stillstand?”) referred to the “Austrian success story” of the Second 
Republic that is anchored in the collective memory as a popular auto-stereotype and 
refers to both political and economic matters. It signals that with EU membership the 
success story would continue. Staying outside the EU, then, was tantamount choosing 
stagnation.
Slogan of the Austrian EU accession campaign 1992–1994
Moreover, refusing EU entrance by means of voting “No” in the 1994 accession 
referendum was portrayed as a way to marginalize the country in European and 
international politics. The slogan “Together or Lonely?” (“Gemeinsam oder einsam?”) 
suggested the request for cooperation within a larger and more powerful community, 
particularly for a small country like Austria. The suggestion was that under the roof 
of the EU, Austria, as a small state, would be able to cope much easier with those 
challenges and threats it faces in contemporary international economics and politics. 
The campaign was successful, and in the final analysis, 66.6 per cent of those who 
participated in the referendum voted for EU accession.
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Slogan of the Austrian EU accession campaign 1992–1994
The Austrian enlargement campaign from 2002 to 2004 also resorted to the 
argument that especially small states are not able to solve their problems alone, by 
using the slogans “Cross-border problems require cross-border solutions” and “Eu-
rope – we increase our chances” (“Europa – wir vergrössern unsere Chancen”). The 
topics presented as cross-border problems were mainly migration, asylum, crime and 
ecological issues such as nuclear power plants in the border regions of the country.
Logo of the Austrian EU enlargement campaign 2002–2004.
It has to be noted that – though Austria shifted from the borders to the centre of the 
EU due to the 2004 enlargement round and Austrian companies strongly expanded into 
the CEE region during the last decade – the majority of Austrians were not in favour of 
EU enlargement in the East, an attitude that does not correspond to the aforementioned 
bridge metaphor. With the exception of Hungary, the former Eastern Bloc states of 
Central and Eastern Europe were not welcomed as EU members by the majority of the 
Austrian population as respective surveys showed (cf. Hintermann et al., 2001). Thus, 
the government tried to promote EU Eastern enlargement by means of a topic-oriented 
campaign, which, by the way, was hardly noticed by Austrian citizens.
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The Hungarian accession campaign (cf. Kurtán, 2005), implemented by a national 
foundation (ÖSEUK), which was founded by the government in order to prepare 
Hungarian society for EU entry (http://www.ufi.hu/feltolt/ufi2003aprilis.pdf) – aimed 
at providing information about the advantages of EU membership and underscoring 
the importance of the referendum. Campaign materials such as placards, folders and 
advertisements in the print media, in the first phase, focused primarily on those social 
groups that were supposed to be particularly afraid of the consequences of EU member-
ship, especially farmers, peasants, workers in agriculture and small entrepreneurs. The 
subjects suggested, for example, that EU membership would provide better chances 
for Hungarian agriculture, family businesses and small companies, on the one hand, 
and present the chance to expand to other European countries, on the other hand.
Subjects of the Hungarian accession campaign 2003 (Young & Rubicam)
64 65
The governmental campaign was complemented by statements of Hungarian 
politicians such as that of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, László Kovács, who stated 
that EU membership would not cause disadvantages, but at most some difficulties, and 
finally the result would make up for those troubles (Népszabadság, 17 February 2003). 
The small states issue was not addressed particularly in this argumentation.
The Slovak EU referendum campaign (Gyárfášová, 2005) was very general in its 
slogans (“We have the future in our hands”, “Let’s not leave it to the others”) and 
carried images of open hands, with yellow EU stars – several of them in one hand, 
while in the other hand just one – symbolized the bid for joining the stronger club. 
The slogan “It’s better to be in than out!” also pointed in the same direction. It was 
shown in two ways: firstly as a picture that shows a boy and a girl divided by an almost 
invisible glass wall; and secondly, a depiction of a fish lying outside an aquarium, out 
of water, in a dangerous situation.
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Boomerang free cards/ Slovak EU accession campaign 2003. Slogan: “It’s better to 
be in than out” (Creo/Young&Rubicam)
Positive public attitudes towards EU membership provided ideal conditions for the 
smooth course of the Euro referendum campaign. The Slovak referendum campaign 
did not target any specific social group and did not put a question mark over the EU 
membership issue. It thus reflected the stage of the EU debate in Slovakia, where EU 
entry was a strategic priority not just for the political élite and above all seen as a ticket 
for little Slovakia to join a sound and prestigious club. 
However, public opinion polls conducted in spring 2003 signalled that the main 
problem would not be the final outcome, but sufficient voter participation and the 
validity of the plebiscite (there is a 50 per cent turnout quorum in Slovakia). Eventu-
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ally, voter turnout reached 52 per cent of eligible voters, which was less than in other 
CEE countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic, but more than in Hungary 
(45.62 per cent). The “Yes” for Slovakia’s EU membership was more than resounding 
(92 per cent), as was the case in Hungary (83.76 per cent).
New role models for small states?
According to the EB 62 survey (autumn 2004), 57 per cent of Slovak citizens 
thought that their country’s EU membership is a good thing. This figure is close to 
the EU 25 average (56 per cent) and is the second highest among the 10 new member 
states. Support for Hungary’s EU membership stood at 49 per cent in autumn 2004. 
In the case of Austria, 46 per cent viewed the country’s EU membership as an 
advantage.
Moreover, according to Eurobarometer, 62 per cent of Austrians came out in favour 
of a more assertive stance of the EU in world politics. An increase in this figure can 
be observed since spring 2004, especially in security matters. This contrasts with the 
fundamental identity factor of neutrality, which has been connected with the special 
role of the small Austrian state in international politics for a long time. The Austrian 
population seems to be in favour of EU integration as a security project too. Surveys 
show that Austrians still stick to neutrality as part of their identity, and the neutrality 
topic was used as a frequent leitmotif in EU campaigning (especially in the European 
Parliament election campaigns, which have not been analysed in this paper). However, 
72 per cent also supported the further development of a common European foreign, 
security and defence policy, free of NATO influence. The opinion is held that decisions 
on European defence policy should be primarily taken by the EU (46 per cent); 30 per 
cent preferred the national government, and only 7 per cent NATO.
Interestingly enough, 63 per cent of Hungarians supported an EU common foreign 
policy as well as their own foreign policy, and 84 per cent agreed that the EU should 
further develop a common defence and security policy. Seventy-five per cent of Hun-
garians agreed that the EU should have a rapid reaction military force to be deployed 
as a trouble-shooter in case of an international crisis. Against this background it has 
to be mentioned that although Hungary has been a NATO member since 1999, the 
Hungarian EU campaign also focused on the advantage of an international security 
system in which large powers and their neighbours, in particular the smaller states, 
would act together and which would guarantee protection.
The Common Foreign Policy of the EU towards third countries was supported 
by 75 per cent of Slovaks, and the highest percentage of supporters (86 per cent) 
was recorded for the Common Defence and Security Policy. This result is probably 
related to the lack of interest among Slovaks in their country’s membership of NATO 
(Slovakia has been a member since 2004) on the one hand, and the lack of tradition 
in foreign policy formulation, on the other hand. Fifty-five per cent of Slovaks felt 
more secure thanks to Slovakia’s EU membership, but in general they did not think 
66 67
their country is particularly threatened because they perceive Slovakia as too small 
and uninteresting to become a potential target for an attack. Fifty-six per cent wanted 
decisions in the field of European defence policy to be made jointly at EU level. As 
in Hungary, a significant majority agreed that the EU should have a rapid military 
reaction force to guarantee stability and peace in the world.
On top of that, public opinion polls show that smallness is mainly perceived as 
a potential problem for the countries´ future development. The campaigns reacted 
to this stereotype: The “in/out” topic was prominently used in the Austrian and the 
Slovak campaigns, by advertising the necessity of belonging to a larger political player 
in order to safeguard prosperity and economic growth, in order to guarantee that the 
small country avoids staying outside and thus would have to cope with forthcoming 
political and economic challenges alone. Entrance into a larger community was 
presented not only as an increase of future chances but a step towards protection and 
shelter as well.
At the same time citizens in all of the three countries are rather pessimistic as 
regards their influence in EU politics, i.e. the influence of their country. When it comes 
to Slovakia, only 37 per cent believed that their country’s voice counts in the EU, while 
in the EU 25 the corresponding figure is 68 per cent. Eighty-three per cent of Slovaks 
believed that the largest countries have the most power in the EU (in the EU 25 overall 
this opinion is shared by 75 per cent of citizens).
In respect to EU accession and enlargement campaigns it has to be stated that 
such topics as common foreign, defence and security policy are hardly mentioned 
as a concrete advantage of EU membership or a field of politics where small states 
too could potentially find new roles to perform on the international scene. a tentative 
explanation might be that EU campaigns in most countries tend to focus on so called 
domestic issues and identity aspects. Ordinary citizens are not particularly interested 
in foreign policy.
The small state topic occurs in political campaigning on European integration and 
enlargement in all of the three countries as an important aspect of the national self-
-image, but there is no clear idea what the smallness of the respective countries could 
mean in the framework of a new European and geopolitical configuration and what 
chances it offers for the construction of a new role in international politics.
The issue that was stressed in the campaigns under analysis was the traditional 
European character of the small states as an identity-founding pattern that had to be 
proved by successful EU integration. At the same time, the entry into the European 
club was presented as a decisive break in the countries´ post-war history: for Austria 
it meant the final step of the rebuilding of the state after 1945 and the crowning of the 
Austrian success story. As regards Hungary and Slovakia, EU membership was linked 
with the decision to clearly become part of the West (Europe), as opposed to remaining 
in the East (sometimes identified with the Balkans). By the way, it has to be mentioned 
that this issue was discussed in Austria as well, on the eve of EU accession, but not 
with the same emphasis. The Austrian and Hungarian campaigns both stressed the 
68 69
connecting and mediating function of their countries, a pattern that perfectly fits the 
traditional roles of small states and goes with the national self-image. Both campaigns 
also reflected tourist images of the countries.
To summarize, what is missing in the analysed campaigns – though debated among 
political élite and discussed in the media – is a clear idea about the future role of the smal-
ler states in European enlargement, neighbourhood and international politics. Moreover, 
one can hardly find any views that would indicate concepts for the formation of a new 
regional or topic-related group. The diversity among European small states seems to offset 
commonalities, such as shared political interests or specific properties of smallness.
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Per Asper Ad Astra.73 Human Security in International 
Relations Practice: a Comparative Study of Foreign 
and Development Policies of EU/HSN Member States
Šárka Waisová
Abstract: In the last 10 years “human security” has even become something of 
a buzzword, used by United Nations agencies, national development agencies, inter-
national as well as national NGOs and, last but not least, by international relations 
scholars. Besides the UN, there are other international forums where the incorpora-
tion of human security issues into foreign and development policy has been discussed 
– primarily in the Human Security Network (HSN) and the European Union. The main 
goal of this text is to analyse and compare the contemporary understanding of human 
security in EU/HSN member states and the human security strategies, instruments and 
approaches of these states. I argue that EU/HSN countries have based their human 
security conceptualization on strong developmental and humanitarian elements, and 
all of them have accepted security-development interdependence. However, the human 
security paradigm is not anything, what is in EU/HSN states’ policies embedded; these 
states have been accepting and using human security only as far as their national 
security strategy and EU membership makes it possible. 
Key words: human security, Human Security Network, European Union, 
Austria, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Slovenia
Debates about security and strategies and instruments for conflict resolution have 
retained their place at the core of international relations theory and practice for several 
decades. In the post-Cold War period, when many bloody local and intrastate conflicts 
have broken out, a broad debate began among politicians as well as scholars about new 
sources of insecurity, possibilities to meet new threats and risks and about the role of 
the state and of international organizations in the maintenance of security. The debates 
showed an agreement that security is crucial, but disagreement as to what it entails and 
how it should be maintained.
In the 1990s in the debate about security and conflict resolution a new term appeared 
– “human security”. In the last 10 years “human security” has even become something 
of a buzzword, used by United Nations (UN) agencies, national development agencies, 
international as well as national NGOs and, last but not least, by international relations 
(IR) scholars. From the vocabulary and politics of UN agencies such as the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) or the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR), we have the feeling that human security is a broadly accepted 
73 Over Hurdles towards the Stars.
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term and deeply rooted approach. However, there is a group of IR actors who generally 
have not accepted this term – and these are states.
Despite this resistance by some states, a (small) group of countries emerged which 
more or less accepted the human security concept in their foreign and domestic poli-
cies. Some of the states supporting human security established a group of like-minded 
countries called the Human Security Network (HSN). The Network emerged from the 
cooperation between Canada and Norway as part of the campaign to ban landmines74. It 
was formally launched at a conference at of Foreign Ministers (of Austria, Canada and 
Norway) in Bergen in 1999. Today the HSN has 12 member states: Austria; Canada; 
Chile; Greece; The Netherlands; Ireland; Jordan; Mali; Norway; Slovenia; Switzerland 
and Thailand, along with South Africa as an observer75. The Human Security Network 
today represents “a coalition of the willing” which, politically and financially, supports 
various programmes and activities to strengthen human security. 
Besides the HSN and the UN there are other international forums where the 
incorporation of human security issues into foreign and development policy has been 
discussed – primarily in the European Union (EU). In recent years many workshops and 
conferences have taken place among EU institutions, EU member states, EU member 
states’ NGOs and scholars about the need to incorporate human security into the EU 
agenda. One of first official steps in this incorporation was a document presented by 
Javier Solana in December 2003 – a Secure Europe in a Better World: a European 
Security Strategy. This document sees both the regional and global environment as 
one of the key conditions of European (EU) security. The Strategy puts forward the 
key security challenges, specifically terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, regional conflicts, state failures on EU borders and organized crime (So-
lana, 2003: 6 – 9). Key referent objects are the EU, its member states and population. 
Solana’s paper also accepts non-military threats as a challenge and understands security 
as a first precondition of development and vice versa (Solana 2003: 6 & 19)76. The 
most important instrument for ensuring EU (member states) security is ensuring the 
human security of the EU as well as the non-EU population (Solana, 2003: 4). To sum 
up, in terms of European security strategy one of most important security strategies is 
securing human security inside EU borders and beyond77. 
74 The Human Security Network grew out of a bilateral arrangement between Canada and Norway, signed 
at Lysřen Island, Norway in 1998. The HSN wanted, through an informal and flexible mechanism, to 
promote actions on behalf of human security. The HSN is today a forum for consultation and its actions 
are based on ministerial meetings at least once a year (Fuentes, 2001).
75 One of the states which also supports human security but is not a member of HSN is Japan. It supports 
human security programmes and strategies primarily within the UN framework, particularly the 
activities of the Human Security Commission, UNDP and UNHCR. 
76 The development-human security nexus is seen also in other EU documents – see for example the 
Annual Report 2004 on the European Community’s development policy and external assistance.
77 … in an era of globalization, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand … 
(Solana, 2003: 11). … Even in an era of globalization, geography is still important. It is in the European 
interest that countries on our borders are well governed (Solana, 2003: 12).
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The European security strategy therefore includes at least two security paradigms: 
national security and human security. However, the “war on terrorism” marginalizes 
human security and development issues in EU policies. Development aid is becoming 
secondary to, and subsumed by, foreign policy concerns. 
The deepening of discussion and the first practical steps towards incorporating 
human security into the EU agenda can be observed during the EU presidency of Ire-
land (first half of 2004) and the Netherlands (second half of 2004). The Irish and Dutch 
EU presidencies significantly influenced the understanding and integration of human 
security into EU policies. As the Irish and Dutch example shows, EU/HSN member 
states can have a great impact on the integration and embedding of human security 
into EU security doctrine and policies. In addition to Ireland and the Netherlands, the 
EU/HSN member states are Austria, Greece and Slovenia. 
The main goal of this text is to analyse and compare the contemporary understan-
ding of human security in EU/HSN member states and the human security strategies, 
instruments and approaches of these states. This can give us a perspective on future 
EU security conceptualization, strategies and instruments, which are still in the process 
of formation. 
The article is divided into four parts. Firstly, I will introduce a brief history of the 
concept of human security. Secondly, I will show how HSN member states understand 
human security and what the difference is between the HSN’s conception of human 
security and other human security conceptions, mainly the conception of the UN and 
its agencies. Thirdly, I will discuss the main issues of the HSN’s agenda, i.e. issues 
which the HSN – as a group of like-minded states – prioritizes. I will also briefly 
mention the values, principles, norms and rules that HSN states share. The fourth part 
of the article analyses the human security conceptualization and priorities of individual 
EU/HSN member states (not all member states prioritize all issues in the same way) 
and demonstrate the instruments and strategies which are used by these states to realize 
their human security priorities.
My text is based primarily on research of the activities and official documents of 
EU/HSN states, such as annual foreign policy yearbooks, development reports and 
statements of EU/HSN representatives; I also studied official web pages, documents 
and activities of EU/HSN states’ partners, especially those of non-governmental 
organizations. 
A brief history of the concept of human security
Although the national security paradigm dominated IR in the last 50 years, the 
emphasis on the security and the sovereignty of the individual is a much older idea (for 
more see Rothschild, 1995). The liberal or pluralistic understanding of security as an 
objective of individuals and groups as well as of states was characteristic, in general, 
of the period from the mid-17th century to the French Revolution. The military sense 
of security, where it is an objective of states, was a new concept that coincided with the 
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Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (Rothschild, 1995). In fact, until the beginning 
of the 20th century, security was seen as a condition both of individuals and of states. 
However, the two world wars, increasing armaments and expanding armies, and finally 
the nuclear path of the superpowers in the 1960s led to a redefinition of security, which 
lost both non-military and non-state features. Since the second half of the 1940s in the 
USA and since the beginning of the 1960s worldwide, the national security conception 
dominated in IR theory and practice (Earle, 1943; Morgenthau, 1948 & 1993 & 1952; 
Souers, 1949; Huzar, 1950; Furniss 1952; Wolfers, 1952 and Waltz, 1979).
In late 1980s a more significant transformation of the concept of security started. 
This was influenced mainly by the work of the Copenhagen School (scholars from 
the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, such as B. Buzan, O. Waever, J. De Wilde, 
P. Lemaitre and M. Kelstrup) and of the Third World School (A. Acharya and M. Ayoob). 
Both challenged the national security paradigm by debate about referent objects of 
security and sources of threats. Buzan, Acharya and Ayoob more or less recognized 
individuals and groups (e.g. humankind and the family) as a referent object of security 
too, and the particular importance of non-military threats such as underdevelopment, 
environmental degradation, resource scarcity and the like. These authors criticized the 
realist vision of security for the individual, who was made synonymous with citizen-
ship, i.e. security comes from being a citizen, and insecurity from being a citizen of 
another state. According to these IR scholars, individuals have explicit rights, which 
are not dependent on the (non-)existence of the state or citizenship.
The idea of rights for the individual or groups, which should exist independently of 
the state, led to the emergence of the human security concept in the theory as well as 
practice of IR. IR practice has had an even deeper impact on the conceptualization of 
human security. The main driving forces in this process during last decade have been 
the United Nations and Canada and the HSN.
UN versus HSN human security discourse
There are many and varied formulations of human security78; most formulations 
emphasize the interdependence between development and security, the welfare of 
ordinary people, maintaining basic human rights and the realization of human 
potential. As noted above, we can identify in contemporary IR discourse two main 
approaches to human security: the first is the United Nations approach; the other is 
that of the HSN (or of Canadian or middle-power states). First, it is necessary to make 
clear the differences between these two approaches and then introduce their common 
elements before we analyse the foreign and development policies of EU/HSN member 
states, because the difference/commonality is crucial for this analysis.
The UN human security agenda is based on the human security definition of 
the UNDP, which “understands security first and foremost as the prerogative of the 
78 Comparison of Human Security Definitions by Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict 
Research on www.hsph.harvard.edu/hpcr/.
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individual, and links the concept of security inseparably to ideas of human rights 
and dignity to the relief of human suffering” (Hammerstand, 2000: 39). The major 
components of the UN human security conception are freedom from fear and freedom 
from want. According to the UN’s conception, human security has various categories 
or dimensions such as economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community 
and political security (Human Development Report 1994: 24 – 25). However, the main 
feature of the UN’s human security conception is prioritising the individual over the 
state. State security is merely the means by which to achieve individual security – the 
state is a means to an end, not an end in itself. One of the most important aspects of the 
UN’s human security conception is the clear human security-level of the development-
-security nexus. This approach essentially equates human development and human 
security by proposing that human security involves alleviating all types of human 
insecurity.
The HSN perspective on human security differs from that of the UN. The HSN 
uses the human security concept as an umbrella to cover a wide humanitarian 
agenda, including support for the International Criminal Court, the ban on landmines, 
prohibition of child sexual and labour exploitation and preventing, suppressing and 
punishing human trafficking. The HSN’s conceptualization of human security focuses 
on the security of people, complementing the traditional emphasis on state security. 
In the HSN perspective, the necessary conditions of human security are maintenance 
of territorial integrity, the building of good (domestic) governance and the broader 
responsibility of the international community. The HSN connects the level of human 
security clearly to the level of development, as does the UN, but the development is 
not understood purely economically. Development in the HSN perspective integrates 
strong human rights aspects. That is why one of the HSN strategies supports the 
internalization (embedding) of human rights norms and values. The HSN’s approach 
is more narrowly focused than the UN’s approach; it focuses on protecting individuals 
and communities against any form of violence.
To briefly sum up this section, what are the differences between the two con-
ceptions of human security and what are their common features? The main common 
feature of both perspectives is acceptance of non-military and indirect threats such 
as underdevelopment, population displacement, and the clear security-development 
nexus. The main difference relates to the understanding of the role of the state and of 
the international community in the maintenance of the security of the individual. The 
UN’s conception has long ignored the state as the guarantor of individual security. The 
UN pays more attention to global forces (such as economic disparities, environmental 
degradation, etc.) and economic (developmental) conditions (such as fair trade and 
minimum living standards). The HSN’s conception prioritizes the enlargement of 
international (global) acceptance of humanitarian law, human rights (and their inter-
nalization by various actors) and socio-economic equity by being careful to respect 
the sovereignty of the state. HSN member states do not understand human security 
as a substitute for conventional security, but rather as a component of it, adding the 
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element that the first priority is concern for the welfare of people, citizens and civil 
society (Fuentes, 2001: 84). 
HSN agenda and strategies
Since the establishment of the HSN in 1999, the issues of priority which form 
the basic framework for HSN member states’ activities and projects have been 
formulated. At the first ministerial meeting, the participants clearly stated that human 
security can be advanced through protection and promotion of human rights, the rule 
of law, democratic institutions, good governance, a culture of peace and the peaceful 
resolution of conflicts (Fuentes, 2001). Between the Lysřen meeting in 1998 and 
the last ministerial meeting in Thailand in late 2004 the following issue areas were 
established in the HSN agenda:
– Millennium development goals: All HSN member states accepted the list of 
MDG and participate in fulfilling them (for more information see 
 www.milleniumdevelopmentgoals.org).
– Anti-personnel landmines: Landmines are seen as one of most serious hurdles 
for local economic development and as a serious threat to the health of all 
local people, primarily children. The HSN aim is to ban the use of landmines 
worldwide and to remove the mines from contaminated countries to increase 
the security and support the development of local communities in post-conflict 
periods. 
– Small arms: Widespread illegal ownership of small arms has had a great 
impact on almost all intrastate conflicts in recent decades. There are regions 
where small arms are a part of daily life. The HSN aim is to establish a control 
mechanism for national, regional and international illicit and licit traffic of 
armaments, decrease the number of illegally held small arms and weaken the 
culture of weapons by building peaceful civil societies.
– Children in armed conflict: In recent decades children have been almost entirely 
hidden by all types of armed conflict. The HSN aim is to identify the specific 
needs of children in armed conflict, primarily to prevent recruitment of children 
into regular as well as irregular armies, to help former child soldiers in leaving the 
armies and finding alternative ways of life and to help children harmed by armed 
conflict (psychosomatic disorders, mine victims, etc.). One element of this issue 
is the fight against all forms of labour and sexual exploitation of children.
– International humanitarian and human rights law: The HSN member states are 
convinced of the strong relevance of international humanitarian and human 
rights law for increasing human security. The aim of the HSN is to broaden 
the human rights norms incorporated into international law and to broaden the 
group of states which sign, ratify and respect these international norms. Two 
elements of this aim are the support of the International Criminal Court and the 
improvement of the situation of refugees and internally displaced persons.
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– Conflict prevention: The HSN member states are convinced that a working 
early warning system and early prevention of the outbreak of violence can 
decrease human suffering and many material losses. The HSN aim is to 
strengthen the capacity of the UN as well as other international, regional and 
local frameworks to develop cooperative strategies for prevention of the use of 
violence. An organic part of this aim is the promotion of gender dimensions in 
peace-building.
– Transnational organized crime, including trafficking in persons: In connection 
with many local and intrastate conflicts, there is an increase in the amount 
of resources obtained by guerrilla forces, warlords and other actors through 
transnational organized crime. The aim of HSN member states is to make 
the international trade of resources more transparent (compare, for example, 
the Kimberley process as an instrument of controlling illicit and licit traffic 
of diamonds79) and to develop the legal framework to combat transnational 
organized crime. 
– Resources for development: the HSN confirms the broadly accepted human 
security-development nexus, the key condition for fulfilling previous tasks 
being to concentrate sufficient resources and to invest them meaningfully and 
transparently.
As mentioned above, HSN works as a group of like-minded countries, whose 
foreign policies are guided by a “human internationalist orientation, which features an 
acceptance that the citizens and governments of the industrialized world have ethical 
responsibilities towards those beyond their borders who are suffering severely and 
who live in abject poverty” (Behringer, 2003: 2). The HSN framework makes possible 
collective action of all or only some of the members, as well as the collective action 
of some members together with non-members and also individual action. In the first 
years of HSN existence, the member states usually took advantage of collective action. 
As Ronald Behringer notes, collective action made it possible for these medium-sized 
powers states to exercise effective leadership in international politics (for more see 
Behringer, 2003). These collective action cases include the attempt to create a rapidly 
deployable brigade for United Nations peacekeeping, the campaign to ban anti-
-personnel landmines, the initiative to establish the International Criminal Court, the 
effort to produce international regulations on the legal trade in small arms and light 
weapons (Behringer, 2003: 1), the initiative to produce international regulations on 
children fighting in armed conflicts and, last but not least, on preventing, suppressing 
and punishing people trafficking (see Table 1).
In the last three or four years, we can often observe the cooperation only among 
some HSN countries which was officially confirmed at a meeting in Santiago. At the 
HSN meeting in Santiago de Chile (2002) member countries even officially concluded 
that human security should be discussed not only in global forums, but that the 
79 www.kimberleyprocess.com:8080/site/, 2 May 2005.
76 77
discourse on human security concerns in regional frameworks should be increased 
(Address by H.E. the Austrian Foreign Minister B. Ferrero-Waldner). Thus, many 
bilateral or trilateral projects among HSN countries have been established in recent 
years and months (see below).
In the following section I will show the specific national human security approaches 
and strategies of HSN states to open the floor for comparison and for analysing the 
possible influence of EU/HSN member states on the EU security conceptualization. 
Austria
Austrian foreign and security policy has been based on neutrality since 1955. 
As a neutral country, Austria – very similar to Ireland – has oriented itself towards 
multilateral cooperation within the UN. Austrian military forces have traditionally 
participated in various peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, and it has funded 
many UN development aid activities. In response to the Gulf War, the prevailing view 
in Austria changed: it now holds that obligations under the Statute of the UN take 
precedence over obligations under neutrality. Further changes of Austrian neutrality 
were mostly influenced by the country’s membership of the EU (since 1995) and by 
adopting Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP). The acceptance of the CFSP and ESDP profoundly changed 
the organizing principles of Austrian security policy, which “is today characterized as 
non-allied rather than neutral” (Resolution of the Austrian Parliament: Security and 
Defence Doctrine). The contemporary Austrian foreign and security policy is dominated 
by state-centred strategies (as in most EU member states and in the CFSP), which were 
furthermore strengthened in accordance with the “war on terror” (Resolution of the 
Austrian Parliament: Security and Defence Doctrine). 
One of the national security strategies seems to be human security and develop-
ment support. Austrian security policy respects the idea that geographical distance 
no longer guarantees sufficient protection of national security and that long-distance 
instabilities and underdevelopment can threaten the country (Resolution of the 
Austrian Parliament: Security and Defence Doctrine). In the Austrian perspective, 
human security and development projects can be a way to ensure the state’s national 
security.
Austria became a member of HSN in 1999 and chaired the Network for the period 
2002–2003. Between 1999 and 2005 it adopted the HSN concept and is one of the 
most active member countries. The Austrian human security approach has been deeply 
influenced by the country’s neutrality and later changes to this policy. The principal 
issues of Austrian human security policy are women’s rights (legal regulation of 
violence against women, particularly a ban on female genital mutilation), children’s 
rights (particularly a ban on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, 
and support of programmes for children affected by armed conflicts) and human 
rights generally (abolishing the death penalty, human rights education, protection of 
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minorities and rights of refugees and internally displaced persons) (Austrian Foreign 
Policy Yearbook 2003).
The main Austrian human security strategies comprise development cooperation 
(for comparison of development aid see Table 2); support and assistance to programmes 
and funds of the UN system (particularly UNIFEM, UN Human Rights Commission, 
UNICEF, UNESCO, ILO, WHO); grants for humanitarian non-governmental orga-
nizations, creation of a human rights education system and initiation of international 
humanitarian law norms and their incorporation into national laws (see Table 1; Austria 
and Norway regularly put forward a resolution on internally displaced persons, within 
the UN). Austria’s partners in human security initiatives are mainly HSN countries 
and governmental (UN and OSCE/chaired by Austria in 2000) and non-governmental 
organizations (International Red Cross Committee and Austrian organizations).
The responsibility for development policy belongs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA), Department VII Development Cooperation, cooperation with Eastern Europe 
and coordination of international development policy. In 2002, upon passing the new 
Federal Development Cooperation Act the several-year long restructuring process of 
the Austrian Development Cooperation was finished. The Act provides an improved 
basis for Austrian development cooperation activities. The Act also strengthened the 
legal status of Austrian NGOs, which are the most important partners of Austrian 
human security policy (Three-Year-Programme 2004–2006 on Austrian Development 
Policy: 23 – 29). Austrian development policy is guided by a commitment to combating 
poverty, ensuring peace and human security, preserving the environment, and pro-
tecting natural resources (Three-Year-Programme 2004–2006 on Austrian Development 
Policy). Two years later, in 2004, an amendment to the Development Cooperation Act 
was passed which created a new structure – the Austrian Development Agency (ADA). 
The ADA, which started operation in 2004, is responsible for implementing projects 
and programmes for development cooperation and cooperation with Eastern Europe. 
ADA especially focuses on promoting human rights, democratic participation and 
responsible governance, as well as on conflict prevention. The main area of Austrian 
interest is Southeastern Europe and Iraq.
Austria concentrates on various mine-action funding and the support of demining 
– in 2002 it served as co-chair of the Standing Committee on the General Status and 
Operation of the Mine Ban Treaty and since 2003 it has financed demining in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Croatia and Mozambique. In 2004 Austria co-organized and chaired 
“The Nairobi summit on a mine-free world”. Together with Slovenia and Jordan, 
Austria established the Initiative to assist war-traumatized children and child victims 
in Iraq, as part of post-conflict reconstruction activities. Austria also supports the 
Slovene Centrum TOGETHER (see below) and is the main donor to the Austrian Aid 
for Mine Victims, an NGO.
Austria (MFA) funds the European Training and Research Centre for Human 
Rights and Democracy in Graz and the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Human Rights 
in Vienna. Both institutes create academic bases for Austrian human security initiatives 
78 79
and prepare policy papers and manuals. During the Austrian HSN presidency the 
Child Rights Training Curriculum “Child Protection, Monitoring and Rehabilitation” 
and the Manual on Human Rights Education was prepared, which has been translated 
into English, Spanish, French and Arabic. Austria also broadly supports the creation 
of regional human rights centres, which provide local human rights training. The 
main idea behind these Austrian human rights activities is to bridge the gap between 
universal human rights standards and their implementation; between programmatic 
concepts and a systematic response on the ground (Chair’s summary. Fifth Ministerial 
Meeting of the HSN). 
Greece
Greek security and defence policy had been traditionally focused on “hard” 
security, particularly on territorial defence. The Greek security conceptualization 
started to change in the 1990s, when “soft” security concerns, including migration 
and refugee flows, took centre stage in the national debate. This significant change 
in foreign policy reflects the new Greek geopolitical position in the post-Cold 
War period, which was caused by the end of Greek geopolitical marginalization 
mainly because of the shifting of security challenges from the centre of Europe to 
the periphery. Greece became an important actor not only in the Balkans, but also in 
the Black Sea region, the Transcaucasus and the Middle East. The country’s foreign 
policy was also strongly influenced by changes within Greek society and in the 
economic and political imperatives of a more European policy. Changes in the EU 
agenda after the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties accelerated profound changes 
in Greek foreign policy; some scholars even say that it is undergoing a process of 
strong Europeanization (Lesser – Larrabee – Zanini – Vlachos 2001: 68 & 103 
– 105). Europeanization involves profound change of value-orientation and of the 
organizing principles of Greek foreign and security policy, which is still markedly 
state-centred. However, in many cases we can observe a growing respect for human 
security.80 
Greece became a HSN member in 2000, and its human security activities are very 
limited in comparison with Austrian efforts. Greece, which recognizes the human 
security-development nexus is at the half-way stage in its adoption of HSN ideas and is 
one of the least active member countries. The principal issues of Greek human security 
policy are peace building, rule of law, human rights (Greece strongly supported the 
establishment of the International Criminal Court), demining activities, eradicating 
organized crime and support of good governance. Greece is one of the EU/HSN states 
with the lowest development cooperation grants. The country itself has participated in 
EU development cooperation since 1999.
80 Possible evidence of Greek human security acceptance could be in the near future the agenda of the 
Greek UN mission within the UN Security Council, because Greece became a UN Security Council 
non-permanent member for the period 2005–2006. 
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The main Greek human security strategies comprise support for all development 
cooperation and demining initiatives in Southeastern Europe and the Black Sea region81. 
The responsibility for development policy belongs to the International Development 
Cooperation Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The national development 
agency – Hellenic Aid – was established within the MFA in 2000. Hellenic Aid 
partners are mainly regional or national NGOs, the Hellenic Foundation for European 
and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), the International Orthodox Christian Charity and the 
Athens-based International Mine Initiative82.
Greece concentrates on various mine-actions and support of demining, mainly 
because of regional conditions. It understands the demining process as a confidence-
-building and conflict prevention instrument within the region and with its neighbours 
– Greece itself actually used landmines on the borders with Turkey and Bulgaria83. 
Greece and Turkey decided to join the Mine Ban Treaty simultaneously (in May 2003), 
and Greece is now carrying mine clearance operation in the Epirus and Macedonian 
regions, and supports demining in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Lebanon. In addi-
tion to helping in the demining process, Greece also assists mine survivors. The main 
bodies involved in this assistance are the Ministry of Defence, the National Health 
Service and the Hellenic Red Cross.
Official development cooperation is the responsibility of the national 
development agency Hellenic Aid. The Responsibilities of Hellenic Aid involve 
designing and implementing the national strategy for urgent humanitarian aid and 
development cooperation. Hellenic Aid concentrates its activities on food security, 
providing aid in emergencies and support of good governance (supporting civil 
society and institutional capabilities). In comparison to Austria, Greece focuses its 
development activities strongly on Southeastern Europe. Since 2002 a Five-Year 
Plan for the Economic Reconstruction of the Balkans (HIPERB) has been in force. 
HIPERB has financed specific projects in the areas of agriculture and processing. 
The main partners for Hellenic Aid are NGOs actively involved in the Balkans 
and ECHO84.
One of the newest Greek initiatives, which are presented as a part of the human 
security framework and which is more or less symbolic, is the creation of the Inter-
national Olympic Truce Centre (officially launched in Athens in 2000). The Centre 
grew out of the agreement between the International Olympic Committee and the 
Greek Governmental should encourage the use of sport and the Olympic ideal to 
promote a peaceful world85. However, until now no projects have been begun. 
81 Greece is a member of the Pact of Stability for South Eastern Europe and also a member of the Black 
Sea Cooperation Initiative.
82 For more see www.deming.gr. 
83 Greece maintains minefields on its border with Turkey and along the Evros River in the north of the 
country. There are also mined areas dating from the Greek Civil War (1947–1949) in the Epyrus, Grammos 
and Vitsi Mountains, and in areas near the border with Bulgaria (Landmine Monitor Report 2003).
84 www.mfa.gr/print/english/foreign_policy/cooperation/creation.html, 2 May 2005.
85 www.olympictruce.org, 4 May 2005.
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Ireland
Ireland has been a neutral country strongly oriented towards multilateral coopera-
tion within the UN. The priorities of Irish foreign and security policy have for many 
years included participation in UN peacekeeping86, development aid, humanitarian 
cooperation and cooperation with non-governmental organizations. Neutrality is more 
deeply embedded in Irish society and politics than it is in Austria, but when we observe 
contemporary Irish neutrality, it is going through the same crisis as in the Austrian 
case. The main reason for the Irish neutrality problem is Irish EU membership, prima-
rily development of the CFSP/ESDP. The UN-oriented multilateral security strategy 
was replaced by a state-centred security paradigm oriented towards NATO and an 
armed EU (White Paper on Defence, 2000). This crisis was demonstrated during 
the referendum on the Nice Treaty, when EU opponents used posters saying “Hello 
NATO, good-bye UN” (Doyle, 2005: 3). This clearly shows that many Irish people 
understand EU/NATO strategies as incompatible with UN strategies and the neutral 
status of the country. 
The human security orientation is today mostly visible in development aid policy. 
Although Ireland became a member of the HSN in 1999, it is adopting the human 
security catalogue relatively slowly. Ireland has been adopting a holistic human 
security paradigm, which focuses on all threats, both those of a violent and those of 
a structural nature. While in the case of Austria and Greece the main driving force 
behind human security initiatives are national governments, in the Irish case the go-
vernment, including the MFA, lagged far behind – the main driving force was NGOs. 
The strongest Irish human security actor is Dóchas, The Irish Association of Non-
-Governmental Development Organizations. Dóchas has organized many workshops, 
conferences and other activities to pressure the Irish government into integrating the 
human security concept not only into Irish, but also into EU external policies. In the 
last two years Ireland has supported the change of the HSN from an informal network 
into more formal fora (Opening Address by Mr. Tom Kitt TD).
Ireland experienced a great deal of progress in adopting human security vocabulary 
and initiatives in late 2003 and in the first half of 2004, in the period of Irish EU 
presidency. But we can observe Irish activities relating to the human security paradigm 
before, in the early 2000s, when Ireland was a UN Security Council (UNSC) non-
-permanent member (Ireland’s term in the UNSC was 2001–2002). The UN Security 
Council has had discussions on geographically defined issues, as well as occasional 
meetings on thematic issues, where the Irish human security perspective was most 
visible. Though the Irish UN mission decided not to hold any such debate87 (Doyle, 
2005: 22), Ireland participated very actively in debates about conflict resolution, the 
relationship between conflict prevention and development aid, the negative humanita-
86 Irish Defence forces have participated in UN peacekeeping since 1958.
87 As John Doyle explains, Ireland took a tactical decision not to use the Council as a platform to raise 
issues on which it had no hope of making progress (Doyle 2005: 28). 
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rian impact of sanctions, and women and security (primarily on the effects of conflict 
on women and girls and the contribution of women to conflict resolution). During 
2001 and 2002 the establishment of the International Criminal Court was discussed 
many times within the Security Council. Ireland promoted the establishment and full 
functioning of the ICC in clear opposition to the USA; Ireland has also rejected any 
suggestions of exemptions for US soldiers or US members of UN missions. 
As mentioned above, the period when progress in Irish human security activities 
was most visible was during the Irish EU presidency. The Irish EU presidency priori-
ties were implementation of the EU Guidelines on Children in Armed Conflict and the 
adoption of EU Guidelines on Support for Human Rights Defenders. Dóchas’ pressure 
during Irish EU presidency led to the initiation of the first (but informal) meeting of the 
EU’s development cooperation ministers, which aimed to focus the debate on the de-
velopment-security nexus. The main result of the NGOs’ discussion with development 
ministers and the Irish MFA was the consensus about future rules for development aid: 
development aid has to be securitized and incorporated into security measures such 
as peacekeeping operations or other UN mandated security missions, because “the 
language of the ’war on terror’ won’t overtake that of development” (Opening address 
by Mr. Tom Kitt TD). 
Ireland is one of the strongest supporters of the UN’s Millennium Development 
Goals. It strongly prefers three issues of human security policy and MDG, which in 
the Irish foreign policy agenda are not officially connected to human security, but are 
main points in the HSN agenda: 1) Development aid; 2) Human rights (particularly 
promotion; protection and support of children’s rights and the International Criminal 
Court); and 3) Provision of UN peacekeeping personnel. This was made possible by 
the evolution of Irish national security beyond the narrow role of territorial defence 
towards issues of conflict prevention, peacekeeping and crisis management. The main 
driving force in development aid and other human security activities is, besides Irish 
NGOs, the Irish MFA (partly in cooperation with Ministry of Defence) and the national 
development agency, Development Cooperation Ireland (so-called Ireland Aid or DCI). 
Ireland Aid, which was established in 1974 (compare the Greek and Austrian cases), is 
assigned to a minister of state for development cooperation and human rights.
When researching Irish human security activities, we can always see a more cross-
-sectoral and comprehensive approach. The Irish strategy of development aid is based 
on coherence between trade and development policy (the Irish motto is “trade people 
out of poverty”). Irish human security activities incorporate strategies on gender, 
governance, HIV/AIDS and development activities88. In comparison to Greece, 
Austria and Slovenia, the Irish development cooperation initiatives are not oriented 
towards European countries, but more or less outside Europe, particularly towards 
sub-Saharan Africa89. As part of the development aid policy (for a comparison see 
88 www.dci.gov.ie/print.asp, 4 May 2005.
89 In March 2003 East Timor became the first country to receive Ireland Aid assistance country outside 
sub-Saharan Africa (www.dci.gov.ie/print.asp, 4 May 2005).
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Table 2) the Irish MFA supports various programmes fighting against HIV/AIDS, 
projects eradicating poverty, and educational projects (The Report of the Ireland Aid 
Review Committee). 
The Netherlands
After their negative experience with neutrality, the Netherlands gave preference to 
NATO and EU membership after the Second World War. The country, which became 
a member of the HSN in 1999, adopted a rather “intermediate” position in respect of the 
human security paradigm in which the NATO state-centred security strategy continue 
to dominate Dutch security policy (Silva, 2001: 65), while the individual-centred secu-
rity paradigm is promoted slowly, and primarily in development cooperation (similar 
to Ireland and Austria). The Netherlands has traditionally supported multilateral UN 
operations and humanitarian and development programmes, but as a former colonial 
empire it has also preserved its own special relationship with many countries in Africa, 
Latin America and Asia. Development, humanitarian and technological aid thus has 
a long tradition in Dutch foreign policy. The colonial heritage, together with issues 
such as international drug and people trafficking and pandemics such as HIV/AIDS 
or SARS, has blurred the traditional distinction between national and international 
security issues. 
During the last few years, five main goals of Dutch foreign policy can be identified: 
1) strengthening of international governance; 2) promoting international peace, security 
and stability; 3) promoting European cooperation; 4) reducing poverty in a sustainable 
way; and 5) maintaining and strengthening bilateral relations90. As we can see, there 
are three goals which are part of the HSN agenda – points one, two and five. The key 
to successful international governance, maintenance of peace and the reduction of 
poverty is, according to the Dutch policy agenda, ensuring an effective international 
legal order, effective conflict prevention and conflict management (particularly peace-
keeping and peace-building) and, last but not least, effective and productive support of 
Millennium Development Goals. 
The main driving force in Dutch human security activities is the, General Directora-
te for International Cooperation (GDIS) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The GDIS 
is headed by a minister without portfolio, the Minister of International Cooperation. 
The Netherlands has traditionally engaged in the fight against poverty and funded 
initiatives supporting marginal sectors of developing countries (ethnic minorities, 
women, children, immigrants etc.). Between 2000 and 2001 the Dutch approach 
became more like that of the Irish – the Netherlands now supports human security 
through trade measures and fiscal and economic reforms (Silva, 2001: 66). The Dutch 
MFA itself calls this approach “an integrated foreign policy”, with close links between 
issues of peace and security, good governance and human rights, trade, poverty, the 
environment and migration (Policy Agenda 2005). During its EU presidency period, 
90 www.minbuza.nl/default.asp?CMS_TCP, 4 May 2005.
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the Dutch policy continued in the Irish way and emphasized the centrality of conflict 
prevention, the Mine Ban Treaty, human rights and “the human rights deficit” in EU 
development policies. The Netherlands promoted a similar policy agenda during its 
presidency of the OSCE (during 2003) and under its Security Council membership (in 
the period 1999 – 2000). 
The Dutch integrated approach uses all instruments (political, diplomatic, military, 
civilian and trade and development cooperation) in a coordinated way, by creating the 
Dutch Stability Fund, which combines Official Development Assistance (ODA) and 
non-ODA funds. All mine action assistance was transferred to the Stability Fund91. 
Since 1999 the Netherlands has been further reforming its development aid policy, in 
which bilateral lines of cooperation with more than 100 countries were replaced by 
bilateral cooperation with around 20.
Although the Dutch government has not fully integrated the human security con-
cept into its vocabulary, the Netherlands has always played a leading role in defending 
human rights and the validity of international humanitarian law (Silva, 2001: 67), 
eradicating poverty (the Netherlands is the biggest donor among EU/HSN member 
countries – for a comparison see Table 2) and improving the situation of women and 
children in armed conflicts. The Netherlands has supported all the HSN’s activities to 
ban the use of landmines and to demine, and to control the illicit and licit trade in small 
arms and light weapons. 
The Netherlands advocates security as a condition for development and vice 
versa; the main Dutch human security strategies comprise development cooperation, 
all-round support for peacekeeping operations, grants for humanitarian non-gover-
nmental organizations and initiation of international humanitarian law norms and 
support of their worldwide acceptance. In comparison to Austria, Greece or Ireland, 
the Netherlands does not hugely support the UNDP or other UN agencies promoting 
the “paternal” concept of human security. The major factor in determining the level of 
the Dutch contribution is the effectiveness of these institutions. The Dutch MFA hardly 
ever gives aid directly to governments; it often implements its human security projects 
through grants for humanitarian and development NGOs. 
Slovenia
The Slovene EU/HSN position is very different from that of all the countries dis-
cussed above: Slovenia is a small, newly independent post-Communist country, which 
for the last 15 years has been confronted with many conflicts in Southeastern Europe. 
The Slovene historical experience and location on the margins of an unstable region 
has led the country to develop a special sensitivity for interethnic understanding and 
multicultural coexistence. The situation in Southeastern Europe also initiated Slovene 
EU and NATO membership. Slovenia, aware of its smallness and weakness, has been 
looking since its independence for multilateral recognition and guarantees; its foreign 
91 www.icbl.org/lm/2004/netherlands, 31 May 2005.
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policy focuses strongly on multilateral action. That is why Slovenia accepted one of 
the main guidelines of the HSN – support of development, proliferation and internali-
zation of international law norms – very quickly. Slovenia itself was, after gaining its 
independence, very active in the legislative sector and signed and ratified many acts 
protecting national minorities, human rights and humanitarian principles. It is even 
one of the few states which have accepted the possibility of UN-led humanitarian 
intervention92.
Slovene HSN membership is very similar to that of Greece: with the end of the Cold 
War Slovenia moved from the security periphery to the European security centre. The 
Slovene security conceptualization is profoundly influenced by the unstable regional 
environment and negative historical experience, and thee foreign and security policy 
is clearly dominated by the state-centred approach. However, the major sources of 
national security threats are asymmetric; non-military sources of threats are becoming 
even more frequent. The appropriate response to asymmetric threats lies, according 
to the Slovene Ministry of Defence, in the formation of a unified and integrated 
system covering security as well as development elements. Slovenia emphasizes the 
interdependence between the security of the state, the individual, society and the in-
ternational community (Strategic Defence Review, 2004). Development, humanitarian 
and technological aid contributes to the greater security of Slovenia. 
As the smallest EU/HSN member country, Slovenia became a HSN member in 
1999. Its main human security strategies comprise aid for children in armed conflicts, 
including child soldiers, human rights education, control of small arms and light wea-
pons, the fight against HIV/AIDS, the ban on landmines, and demining. Development 
cooperation remains for the time being on the periphery of Slovene human security 
strategies. The main reason for this has been the relative poverty of the country and 
the great costs of comprehensive economic reforms at the beginning of the 1990s. 
Since Slovenia is an EU member country, the amount of development aid and the 
level of development cooperation is increasing in accordance with EU demands (The 
Consequence of Enlargement for Development Policy 2003) (for a comparison see 
Table 2). The main areas of interest for Slovene human security projects have been, for 
many years, Southeastern Europe and, more recently, Iraq. 
The Slovene partners within human security initiatives are mainly HSN countries 
(Austria and Jordan) and governmental (UN – especially UNICEF – and the OSCE 
– chaired by Slovenia in 2005) and non-governmental organizations. In fact, all Slove-
ne human security projects are primarily implemented by Slovene NGOs or NGOs in 
which the country participates. These NGOs gain their main resources for the carrying 
out of human security projects from the Slovene MFA or Austrian, American, Irish and 
92 Slovenia shares the perception of the UN General Assembly and supports the UN’s new policies relating 
to security, which state that in cases such as those related to crime on a large scale against the civilian 
population, the protection of human life shall be a priority before the sovereignty of the state. … That 
is why Slovenia strongly supports the concepts of humanitarian intervention (Permanent Mission of the 
Republic of Slovenia to the UN). 
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Canadian governments. Therefore, when we speak about specific Slovene initiatives, 
we have to mention the NGO activities.
Slovenia is not only active in the legislative area, but it also takes on practical 
actions to further the implementation of the adopted HSN standards. Through joint 
projects between Slovenia and the Council of Europe, both are contributing within 
the Stability Pact to the building of democracy and setting up of the mechanisms for 
human rights protection in the whole of Southeastern Europe. Slovenia is also very 
active in human rights bodies within the UN.
A concrete instance of carrying out the human security paradigm is Slovenia’s 
assistance to traumatized children in Southeastern Europe. This assistance is organized 
by the biggest Slovene NGO, Slovene Philanthropy. First the International Trust Fund 
for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF) was established, which assisted 
war-affected children in the former Yugoslavia and Transcaucasus; later the Regional 
Centre for the Psychosocial Welfare of Children – TOGETHER – was created93. As 
well as giving aid to children, Slovene Philanthropy and TOGETHER concentrate 
their activities on refugees and asylum seekers and on human rights education. Both 
institutions organize psychosocial programmes for school staff, health service workers, 
parents, and others94. 
A contemporary Slovene-led activity, which is supported by Austria and Jordan, is 
a project assisting Iraqi children. The initiative, which is carried out by TOGETHER, 
aims to alleviate the suffering of children, prevent long-term psychosocial trauma, 
and introduce activities to improve mental health, as well as develop activities for 
the rehabilitation of children. Jordan also cooperates with Slovene-run ITF to start 
demining operations in Iraq. Furthermore, Slovenia is fully supporting the Global 
Fund for HIV/AIDS, the protection of sustainable development, establishment of the 
International Criminal Court and, last but not least, combating the illegal trade in 
small arms. 
Conclusion
This article analysed the conceptualization of human security in EU/HSN countries 
and their strategies for increasing and strengthening human security, in order to show 
how these states could influence EU policies and security conceptualization in the 
future. Some of the findings of the research are really surprising and show the human 
security policies in a different light than they were previously seen. The research 
also affirms the deep difference between the UN’s and the HSN’s human security 
conceptualization.
EU/HSN countries have based their human security conceptualization on 
strong developmental and humanitarian elements, and all of them have accepted 
security-development interdependence. However, the human security paradigm is 
93 http://slonews.sta.si/index.php?id=896s=38, 4 May 2005.
94 www.together.si, 4 May 2005.
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not anything, what is in EU/HSN states’ policies embedded; these states have been 
accepting and using human security only as far as their national security strategy 
makes it possible. Human security seems in many cases to be a mere annex of national 
security because increasing and strengthening of the former is one of many strategies 
states use to ensuring their own national security. Contemporary national security is 
mainly understood as the security of a state and its citizens, who are threatened not 
only by military, but also by many non-military and asymmetric threats. Humanitarian, 
development and technological aid should stabilize target states or societies, increase 
their level of development, decrease the probability of an outbreak of violence, and 
thus minimize the insecurity spillover effect. It follows that the security-development 
nexus in EU/HSN countries means something different from the UN human security 
conceptualization.
In the approach of EU/HSN countries, the security-development nexus unambi-
guously means: the development of a target state/society strengthens its stability (i.e. 
reaching a state of non-violence or of negative peace), which increases the security of 
EU/HSN countries and their inhabitants. In the UN’s approach, the security-develo-
pment nexus means: the development of target for a society strengthens its stability 
and builds a safe environment for everyday life of its inhabitants, which allows further 
development aid or investments. In the long-term perspective, this approach brings 
positive peace; it means not only freedom from fear, but also freedom from want. 
The self-interested motive of EU/HSN countries is indicated also by the territorial 
orientation of human security projects and the territorial distribution of humanitarian, 
development and technological aid. Although living conditions in Rwanda, Somalia 
or Cambodia are poorer and more miserable than in Southeastern Europe, the Black 
Sea Region or Transcaucasus, most Austrian, Slovene and Greek development or 
humanitarian resources go to the latter three regions. Despite the slightly different 
Irish and Dutch cases – Ireland is an island and the Netherlands a maritime country 
surrounded by peaceful, highly developed Western European nations – neither country 
helps the poorest and most needy people. 
Another finding of the present research is the influence of Europeanization and 
of the integration of the CFSP and ESDP into EU and national policies in the human 
security conceptualization and the practical politics of EU/HSN countries. As shown, 
humanitarian and development cooperation has a long tradition in the Netherlands, 
Ireland and Austria. The evolution of the CFSP and ESDP as state- and military-
-oriented policies and the beginning of the “war on terror” have disrupted or at least 
slowed down the progress of humanitarian and development cooperation within these 
three countries. We can even say that EU membership has had a negative impact on 
embedding human security into Dutch, Irish and Austrian policy. Ireland and also the 
Netherlands tried to overcome, during their EU presidency, this military orientation, 
emphasizing the security-development nexus. The strengthening of cooperation and 
of coordination of development and humanitarian activities among EU member 
countries (and also among EU member countries and NGOs) and the commitment 
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to increase the amount of Official Development Aid in the next decades demonstrate 
that the Irish and Dutch efforts have shown results. Austria will be the next country 
to have the opportunity to integrate human security elements into EU policies in the 
first half of 2006.
Greece and Slovenia are very different cases. Regional conditions and historical 
heritage are reasons why both states have had a state-centred and military-oriented 
security conceptualization and why human security has been entirely new for them. 
Both states also do not have any historical experience with humanitarian, development 
and technological cooperation. While in the case of Austria, Ireland and the Nether-
lands EU membership has actually slowed down the progress of the human security 
paradigm, in the case of Greece and Slovenia EU membership has played a completely 
different role. Europeanization of Greek and Slovene politics and society has been 
changing the value-orientation and organizing principles of their foreign and security 
policy. EU membership (in the case of Slovenia, preparation for EU membership) has 
thus had an unambiguously positive impact on the embedding of human security into 
Greek and Slovene policy.
We need not be as pessimistic as some aspects of this analysis might lead us to be. 
Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, Greece and Slovenia have many times supported 
multilateral rule-based international order and human security issues like the ICC, the 
ban on landmines, help for children and human rights, which did not result in direct 
(political, economical or security) gains. This gives us hope that human security will 
one day be an inherent part of international relations practice.
Table 1: Ratification of international rights/child protection treaties by HSN 


















































































































































































Austria R R R R R R R R R R S
Greece R R S R R R R R R S S
Ireland R R S R R R R R R S S
Netherlands R S S R R R R R R R S
Slovenia R R R R R R R S R R R
R = ratified; S = signed
88 89
References and resources (Child Rights Training Curriculum. Child Protection, 
Monitoring and Rehabilitation 2003: 33)
– Convention of the Rights of the Child (1989); entry into force: 2 September 
1990
– Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involve-
ment of Children in Armed Conflict (2000); entry into force: 12 February 2002
– Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child 
Pornography (2000); entry into force: 16 January 2002
– International Labour Organization Convention 182 concerning the prohibition 
and immediate action for the elimination of the worst forms of child labour 
(1999); entry into force: 19 November 2000
– Geneva Convention (III) relating to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949); 
entry into force: 21 October 1950
– Geneva Convention (IV) relating to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War (1949); entry into force: 21 October 1950
– Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 
I and II) (1977); entry into force: 7 December 1978
– Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer 
of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (“Ottawa Convention”, 
1997); entry into force: 1 March 1999
– Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951); entry into force: 22 April 1954
– Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998); entry into force: 
1 July 2002
– Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children (2000), supplementing the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime (2000); not yet in force
Table 2: Official development assistance per capita: EU/HSN member states 






Source: EU Donor Atlas 2004: 59
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